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1. INTRODUCTION
The four WWER-440/213 units at Paks NPP, Hungary
are approaching to their last decades of licensed and
designed term of operation. Design life-time of WWER-
440/213 type reactors/plants is 30 years and the operational
licence had been limited to that term. Detailed feasibility
study demonstrates the possibility of extension of operational
lifetime by additional 20 years, thanks to operational and
maintenance practice, and robustness of design of the
structures and components. Enhancement of the reactor
thermal power by 8% will increase the net power output
(from 460MWe to 500MWe), consequently, it
improves the competitiveness of the plant and makes the
long-tem operation (LTO) even more reasonable. Long-
term operation of Paks NPP is widely supported by the
public in Hungary. According to Hungarian regulations,
a formal license renewal (LR) is required for prolongation
of operation. However safe and economically reasonable
prolongation of operation of Paks WWER-440/213 type
plant and any other old vintage plans should be
considered in broader context. It requires:
a) a comprehensive engineering practice, which integrates
- up-to-date knowledge on ageing phenomena,
- vigilance through condition monitoring /ageing
management,
- ability to recognise the unexpected phenomenon
when it arises,
- a consequent application of best practices,
- feed-back of experiences,
- proper consideration of WWER-440/V213 features,
- graded approach in accordance with safety relevance
and plant lifetime limiting character of the given
structure/component and ageing process;
b) a regulatory framework for controlling the safety
both in the act of licence renewal and continuously
during the operation.
Consequent application of these attributes will result
in a gapless system of plant practice, applied engineering
tools, methodologies and regulatory control processes. 
A “gapless” plant system/approach means:
- all systems, structures and components (SSCs) have
to be covered by certain plant programme,
- all ageing processes have to be considered,
- all plant activities have to be considered, i.e. the routine
activities should be integrated with those specific to
LTO utilizing the synergy between them.
Above criteria are valid for the regulatory frame as well.
Operational license of WWER-440/213 units at Paks NPP, Hungary is limited to the design lifetime of 30 years.
Prolongation by additional 20 years of the operational lifetime is feasible. Moreover, enhancement of the reactor thermal
power by 8% will increase both the net power output and the competitiveness of the plant. Paks NPP is a pioneer considering
the power up-rate and preparation of long-term operation of WWER-440/213 design. Systematic preparatory work for long-
term operation of Paks NPP has been started in 2000. A regulatory framework and a comprehensive engineering practice
have been developed. According to the authors view, creation of a gapless engineering system via consequent application of
best practices, and feed-back of experiences together with proper consideration of WWER-440/V213 features are the
decisive elements of ensuring the safety of long-term operation. That systematic engineering approach is in the focus of
recent paper. Key elements of justification and measures for ensuring the safety of long-term operation of Paks NPP
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Obviously, the value of the system outlined above
does not originate in its scientific novelty rather than in
creative use of proven knowledge/techniques for solution
of plant ageing problems while finding balance between
safety and economy of operation. 
Description of the preparation of long-term operation
and licence renewal of Paks NPP is given in [1] and [2].
In recent paper, systematic adaptation of principles
outlined above is presented with the aim to show, that
any particular practice of long-term operation should be
tailor made taking into account the peculiarities of the
plant design, national regulations and plant existing
practice, and any particular practice could be adequate if
it follows the basic principles above. From this point of
view, key elements of ensuring the safety of long-term
operation of Paks NPP are discussed. 
2.  CONCEPT OF ENSURING SAFETY IN LONG-
TERM
2.1 Regulatory Framework for Long-Term
Operation
In case of Hungary a gapless regulatory system for
ensuring the plant safety in long-term means: 
a) a regulatory framework should be in place for control
of compliance with current licensing basis;
b) license renewal should focus on control of safety
function of lifetime-limiting structures and
components;
c) completeness and adequacy of plant activities with
respect to a) and b) should be also controlled.
According to Hungarian regulations, compliance with
Current Licensing Basis (CLB) is controlled via annual
updating of Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and the
routine Regulatory inspections and approvals. The content
of FSAR is similar to those required by U.S. NRC Regulatory
Guide 1.70 (Rev. 3). The FSAR consist also the definition
of design bases. 
The periodic safety review (PSR) is a tool for overall
assessment of plant safety. PSR is not a licensing tool,
nevertheless limitations and conditions to the operational
licence also safety upgrading measures might be defined
on the basis of PSR. The scope of the review is very
similar to those described by IAEA NS-G-2.10 Guideline. 
According to Hungarian regulation the control of
performance and safety functions shall be ensured by
certain plant programme or justified by analysis (i.e. by
time limited ageing analyses – TLAAs). Performance
and function of passive long-lived structures and
components should be ensured by ageing management
programmes, while functioning of active systems should
be tested during the operation. Performance of latter has
to be ensured via maintenance under maintenance rule
(MR), i.e. evaluation and assessment of the effectiveness
of the maintenance along safety criteria, and/or via
implementation of the programme for maintaining the
environmental qualification (EQ). Plant may select and
optimise the methods applied for particular SSCs, while
the plant practice should be gapless, i.e. all SSCs and
degradation mechanisms affecting the safety functions
should be covered by the system. However, in case of
structures and components of high safety relevance,
regulation requires performance of dedicated ageing
management programmes. In case of systems working in
harsh environment dedicated programme for maintaining
of environmental qualification is required. This corresponds
to the principle of graded approach.
License renewal is an act when the regulatory authority
is checking practically all licensing conditions with
specific attention to the lifetime limits of the plant, i.e.
condition, ageing management and expected lifetime of
long-lived passive safety classified structures and
components. This is very similar to the 10 CFR 54 license
renewal rule of U.S. NRC.
However in Hungarian regulation some deviations
exist compared with the U.S. rules of licence renewal.
According to the principles outlined in the introduction, a
snapshot-type picture of the condition and lifetime limits
of long-lived passive safety classified structures and
components does not guarantee that the plant programmes
and activities are effective and cover all SSCs and
degradation mechanisms. Therefore the plant has to prepare
Programme of Long-term Operation (LTO Programme)
and submit it for regulatory control not later than 4 years
before expiration of the operational licence (in particular
case of Paks NPP by the end of 2008). 
The LTO Programme consist of results and conclusions
of reviews of ageing management programmes (AMPs)
and time limited ageing analyses (TLAAs) and the
measures resulting from those reviews, as well as the
assessment of effectiveness of other plant programmes,
i.e. effectiveness of the implementation of maintenance
rule, programme for EQ, plans for condition dependent
replacements and reconstructions, programme for
ensuring the ability/knowledge of operational organisation.
It means the regulation of LR builds a strong link between
activities specific to LR and other plant processes, like
knowledge management, reconstruction, solving of
obsolescence issue.
Formal application for licence renewal has to be made
one year before the licence expiring (in case of Unit 1 it
has to be done by the end of 2011). In the application the
experience of three years operation in accordance with
LTO Programme has to be evaluated and assessed. It has
to be demonstrated that the LTO Programme is effective,
it ensures the safe operation and comparing with the
observed trends the forecasts made for justification of the
safety of extended operation remain valid. 
The Hungarian regulatory frame might seem multiple
redundant. However the relation between FSAR and PSR
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and LR is clear. 
The plant safety and compliance with current licensing
basis has to be demonstrated in the annually updated
FSAR, while the long term tendencies (ageing, feedback
of experiences, new scientific evidences, new requirements)
affecting the plant safety have to be assessed in PRS every
ten years. The first Periodic Safety Review of Paks NPP
(1995-1999) resulted in a comprehensive safety upgrading
programme of Paks NPP. Second PSR of Paks NPP has
been completed in 2007 focus more on plant ageing. The
subsequent PSRs will validate also the forecasts made for
LR with respect to the efficiency of AMPs and statements
on time-limited ageing analyses (TLAAs). The PSR and
annual updating of FSAR contain complementary
information, which is required and sufficient for demonstrating
the safety at the moment and in long-term. 
LR is focusing on the ageing and ageing management
of long lived passive structures and components. However
the programmes for maintaining the intended safety
function of active systems and equipment shall be reviewed
and their efficiency shall be assessed in the Licence
Renewal Application.
LR results shall be used in augmentation of the FSAR
with respect to ageing management, time limits set by
ageing analyses, etc. 
2.2 Core Tasks of License Renewal
Core tasks of the preparation of LTO are directly linked
to the requirements of the re-licensing. It covers the
following main tasks: 
a) assessment of the plant status, review and demonstration
of adequacy of plant ageing management programmes
(AMPs); 
b) review, validation and reconstitution of time limited
ageing analyses (TLAAs). 
c) development of the LTO Programme.
The first two above tasks are the known basic tasks
for licence renewal. These represent the adaptations of 10
CFR 54. The technical content of these tasks also similar
to those defined in 10 CFR 54. International experience
summarised has been also used while performing these
tasks, e.g. [3]. However there are essential deviations
from the well-known way of performing review of AMPs
and validation of the TLAAs. Technical reason of these
deviations will be discussed below, demonstrating the
creative way of adaptation of proven techniques to a
plant with specific design features. LTO Programme
represents a specific and essential element of the preparation
of long-term operation and license renewal in case of
Paks NPP, which will be discussed too. 
3. AGEING MANAGEMENT REVIEW
3.1 Definition of the Scope of AMPs
Scope of ageing management programmes at Paks
NPP has been derived from the scope of license renewal.
As a regulatory process, licence renewal is focusing on
plant safety. Therefore the scope of LR covers all safety
classified structures, systems and components (SSCs),
which have to perform intended safety function during
all operational lifetime. Those non-safety SSCs have to
be included into the scope, failure of which may
inhibit/affect the safety functions. 
From this total scope the passive long-lived non-
replaceable structures and components (SCs) have to be
selected, since these SCs limit the plant lifetime. These
SCs might require ageing management since they are non
replaceable. However, proper programmes have to be in
place in a gapless system for ensuring the functions of
screened out SSCs. 
3.2 Problems Related to WWER-440/213 Design
Applying the scoping and screening principles
outlined above, first essential peculiarity of WWER-
440/213 design is related to the extreme large number of
safety classified SSCs. In case of Paks NPP the number
of SSCs within Safety Classes 1-3 is over hundred
thousand. The number of passive, long-lived of SCs is
also very large. It could be explained by the six-loop
design and evolutionary character of the development of
the WWER-440/213 type. The other cause of the large
number of safety classified items is the deterministic way
of classification, which classifies obligatorily large
number of SSCs with apparently marginal contribution to
core melt frequency. 
After screening out the active and short lived
systems, approximately 35000 mechanical, 6500
electrical and 2000 structural SCs have been identified to
be in scope. This magnitude of the scope multiplies all
the ageing management effort of the plant and also the
volume of the reviews for LR. Therefore methods should
be applied for reasonable management of this large
scope, e.g.: 
- careful structuring is required for effective organisation
of ageing management;
- proper IT tools have to be developed for support of
organisation of ageing management and dealing with
information related to condition of the SCs. 
The IT system developed for AM and LR support
had been already reported in [4]. Here the structuring and
organisation of AMPs will be discussed only.
3.3 Structuring, Organizing the Ageing
Management Activity
Here the graded approach should be applied
according to the safety relevance of the given structure or
component and plant life-time limiting character of the
given ageing mechanisms. Accordingly, SCs have been
separated into two categories:
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- highly important from safety point of view items with
complex features and ageing mechanisms;
- items, e.g. pipelines, pipe elements (elbows, T-pieces),
valves, heat exchangers, which have the same type,
safety class, identical design features, materials,
operating circumstances, dominating ageing mechanism
could be grouped into commodity groups and for each
commodity group a designated AMPs should be
implemented.
The highly important SCs like reactor pressure vessel
(RPV) together with internals, components of main
circulating loop (SCs of Safety Class 1 and some SCs of
Class 2) should have dedicated AMPs, which are composed
from several programmes each of them is addressing one
of the mechanism or critical location. 
Considering the mechanical SCs around 150
commodity groups have been identified. The number of
structural commodities exceeds 25. 
Also the ageing management programmes have to be
structured in a hierarchy that allows better organisation
of the plant activity. This could be illustrated on
the example of building structures and structural
components. 
The WWER-440/213 design is very much differing
from the usual architecture of PWRs. In case of Paks
NPP practically all buildings, earth structures, etc. at the
plant are within the scope. Most of these building
structures are complex, and heterogeneous from the point
of view of structural design, layout, manufacturing and
construction of members, material composition and
contact with environment. 
In case of Paks NPP it would be difficult to adopt the
AMPs described in GALL Report [5], where nine groups
of building structures, seven groups of structural
components are defined and ten ageing management
programmes cover the whole scope. (They are: ASME
BPV Code, Section XI, Subsections IWE, IWL and IWF,
the leak-test programme in accordance with 10 CFR 50,
APPENDIX J, a masonry wall programme, a generic
Structures Monitoring Program under 10 CFR 50.65 MR,
an inspection programme for water-control structures (in
accordance with RG 1.127), a protective coating
monitoring programme, and partly the water chemistry
and boric acid corrosion programme.)
Therefore establishment of ageing management of
structures, and structural components should be done
according to following procedure: 
a) development of basic (type A) AMPs:
- Identification of typical structural elements/members
(commodities) from which the plant building
structures are built up, according to design/type,
material, manufacturing/construction and environment,
(e.g. reinforced concrete columns, walls in air inside
the buildings);
- Identification of ageing mechanisms for all
commodities;
- Development of AMPs for each of commodities.
These programmes are generic in sense that they
might be applied for the same structural commodity
in any building.
b) Development of (type B) AMPs for complex
structures/ buildings:
- Identification of complex structures, buildings or
parts of building which form an entity from ageing
management point of view;
- Identification of basic AMPs to be applied in case of
a given complex structure;
- Definition of conditions of application of basic AMPs,
e.g. critical locations in particular building, criteria of
acceptability of ageing effects for a particular member
in particular building; 
- Definition of schedule, logistics of application of basic
AMPs for given complex structure. This is necessary
since the accessibility of buildings should be taken
into account as well as the particular requirements for
the application of the basic AMPs for the given
structure.
The type A programmes have been developed for
commodities below:
Using the type A programmes for specific structures
(commodities) 30 programmes of type B have been
composed which covers all plant building structures. 
It is obvious the hierarchical structure of the AMPs is
plant specific. The established hierarchy of the ageing
management programmes demonstrates a real adaptation
of best international practice to WWER-440/213 instead
of copy-paste. In the same time, the identified ageing
mechanisms, and other elements of an adequate ageing
management programmes are in accordance with
international practice [3, 5]. 
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- Foundations - Reactor support structure 
- RC-structural members - High temperature concrete
- Equipment foundations - Water steel structures
- Prefabricated panels - Water RC structures
- Masonry walls - Earth structures
- Steel-structures - Cable and pipe supports
- SS-liners programme - Cable and pipe penetrations
- Main building settlement - Support structures of cabinets
- Building movement - Doors and hatches
- Corrosion in boric acid environment - Paintings and coatings
- Liners (C-steel) - Fire protection structures
- Leak-tightness tests - Sealing's and isolation
4. REVIEW AND VALIDATION OF TIME-LIMITED
AGEING ANALYSES
Review and validation of TLAAs is an essential
element of the justification of licence renewal. This task
seems to be rather complex in case of Paks NPP, similar
to any other WWER-440/213 plant. The issue is related
to the availability of design base information and
incompleteness of the delivered design documentation.
Although Paks NPP performed a design base (DB)
reconstitution project, part of the original design
assumptions, inputs and the design conditions remained
unknown. Often the final results of the analyses are
known only; in some cases the analyses are presumably
obsolete. It had been recognised that the recovery and
review of original TLAAs would be insufficient for
justification of licence renewal because of essential
changes in regulatory requirements affecting also the
design bases. The TLAAs have to be reviewed and
verified for most important SCs by control calculations
using state-of-the-art methods. In many cases the time
limited ageing analyses have to be newly performed in
accordance with the recent requirements and guidelines.
Review, validation and reconstitution of TLAAs implicate
also verification of existing strength calculations for
selected most important SCs.
Review, validation and reconstitution of TLAAs for
LR of Paks NPP have been reported in [6]. Most
important aspects of this key issue will be discussed here.
These are related to the scope time limited ageing analyses,
their methodology and peculiarities of the adaptation of
ASME BPVC.
First step of the tasks is the definition of the scope of
SCs to be examined and scope of analyses to be
performed. According to Hungarian regulation this scope
shall cover the SCs of Safety Class 1 and 2, which
includes the reactor pressure vessel (RPV), steam
generators (SG), pressurizer vessel, cases of the main
circulating pumps and the main gate valves, other Safety
Class 1 and 2 pipes, vessels, pumps, heat exchangers and
valves. Considering the amount of required analyses, the
fatigue analysis to be reviewed or newly performed shall
cover the Safety Class 1 and 2 components. Analysis of
the reactor pressure vessel includes PTS calculation, and
developing new p-T curves. Where appropriate the
thermal stratification has to be analysed. A specific
requirement is the checking whether a ten years margin
exist above the 50 years of operation. Obviously, the
scope of analyses required by Hungarian regulation
exceeds the scope of regular review of TLAAs performed
for licence renewal. 
Hungarian regulations require application of state-of-
the-art methods, codes and standards while performing
the time limiting ageing analyses. ASME Boiler &
Pressure Vessel Code, Section III: Rules for Construction
of Nuclear Facility Components, edition 2001 (hereafter,
ASME BPVC III) had been selected for the reconstitution
of TLAAs and associated strength verification. Use of
ASME code is a generic decision of the Paks NPP.
Currently the ISI programs at Paks NPP are under
comprehensive review in order to modify them to meet
the requirements of the ASME BPVC Section XI and
ensure the proper ageing management (see [7]). 
The code selection requires understanding of both the
Russian (Soviet) design standards and the ASME code.
Different studies had been performed for ensuring the
adequacy of ASME implementation for WWER-440/213.
A comprehensive and very detailed Methodology and
Criteria Document has been developed, which describes
the routine application of ASME BPVC III and also
provides additional instructions regarding specific aspects
of strength calculations and validation/reconstitution of
TLAAs.
It is obvious that unavoidable deviations shall be
between a routine ASME BPVC III analysis and recent
methodology of reconstitution of TLAAs for Paks NPP.
These deviations are caused either by specific regulatory
environment or by technical peculiarities of the WWER-
440/213 units.
An important issue of the ASME BPVC III
application is related to definition of material properties.
With this respect the manufacturer’s national and
industrial standards, designers or manufacturer’s
technical specifications and former Hungarian regulatory
rules related to materials, welding and quality assurance
shall be considered as relevant. If the relevant
information could not be recovered from the supplied
documentation, the Russian PNAE G-7-002-86 [8] code
shall be applied. 
Materials of the equipment of WWER-440/213
within the scope of fatigue analyses are carbon steels,
low-alloy steels (ST20, 22K, 15H2MFA, 18H2MFA)
and stainless-steels (08H18N10T, 08H18N12T). From
the point of view of reconstitution of TLAAs the fatigue
curves have very important role. Consideration has been
made for the proper selection of fatigue curves.
Applicability of material-specific fatigue curves specified
by Russian code PNAE has been justified. For this reason
the empirical, theoretical background of fatigue curves
has been analysed. Based on these studies the fatigue
curves to be applied in the analyses are the material-specific
curves in PNAE. Impact of the environment on the fatigue
is accounted by adaptation of current U.S. practice.
Reconstitution of TLAAs has specific aspects with
respect to the brittle fracture analysis. It has to be
performed for all critical cross-sections of the equipment
according to the Code. However, in case of already operating
pumps and valves, impact test results for materials are
not available. In this case analysis has to be performed
according to the method and procedure developed in
frame of VERLIFE Project [9]. 
Change of transition temperature due to ageing might
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be calculated according to either PNAE or VERLIFE
methodology. Considering the time limit of operation of
the RPV, neutron irradiation damage, thermal ageing and
low-cycle fatigue decreasing the fracture toughness of
the RPV materials should be analysed. According to
extensive studies performed by designer and Hungarian
experts the pressurised thermal shock (PTS) is the most
critical lifetime limiting event for RPV. Effect caused by
neutron irradiation is dominating near the core. This part
of RPV is most sensitive from the point of view of brittle
crack initiation and propagation. At other parts of RPV,
the stresses might be much higher and the neuron fluence
much lower than in the area of beltline region. Such
locations are the nozzles and their vicinity, the vicinity of
the supporting flange and weld 3/5. According to the
studies performed the vicinity of the weld 8/9 is not a
critical location for PTS, nevertheless it is included into
the analysis. The reactor main flange and its vicinity not
exposed to high neutron radiation, consequently it is not
critical from point of view of PTS. The same is valid for
RPV head and the nozzles on it. These parts of RPV are
not exposed to high neutron radiation and the stresses
from internal pressure are considerably lower than in the
nozzle region. Deterministic methodology of PTS
analysis is given and prescribed in dedicated Hungarian
regulatory guidelines.
With respect of RPV safety the LTO Programme
includes management of RPV properties of aged
structural materials, examination of further surveillance
specimens, evaluation of expected effects of the measures
affecting integrity (heating of coolant in emergency core
cooling system, etc.).
Ageing due to fatigue affects the components of RPV
in different extent. The designer and the manufacturer
performed the basic fatigue analyses for the RPV critical
components. In the frame of preparation of LR these
analyses will be renewed taking into account the design
base conditions. However, in order to determine time
limit of operation of RPV and justification of long-term
operation (50 years), it is necessary to account all effects
of ageing, i.e. elements critical for PTS have to be
checked also for fatigue and the elements critical for
fatigue must be reviewed also for PTS.
In the frame of the TLAA reconstitution the critical
brittle fracture temperature (Tk) of the aged condition of
the reactor pressure vessel materials has been re-evaluated.
The value of neutron fluence in the characteristic points
of the capsule assemblies participating in the surveillance
programme as well as the values of the relevant neutron
fluence distributions in the critical cross sections of the
reactor pressure vessels regarding the base material and
the weld material of the 5/6 weld, for the 60th and 50th
years of reactor operation should be considered, presuming
108% and 100% power rates. The effects from the
reactor thermal power up-rate are accounted here. 
If it is necessary, modification of in-service-inspection
programmes have to be identified and developed for
management of aging during the period of extended
operation on the basis of review, validation and
reconstitution of TLAAs.
5.  LTO PROGRAMME
5.1 Development, Implementation and Evaluation
of the LTO Programme
Development, implementation and subsequent
evaluation of a programme for long-term operation are
an essential element in Hungarian practice. The function
of passive long-lived non replaceable SCs is ensured by
AMPs and justified by re-validated for extended operational
lifetime TLAAs. Review of AMPs and TLAAs, also the
evaluation and assessment of effectiveness of other plant
programmes resulted in measures for amendment of
ongoing plant practice. However, in a gapless system,
proper programmes have to be in place for ensuring the
functions all of SSCs (maintenance under maintenance
rule, programme for EQ, condition dependent, scheduled
replacements, reconstructions). 
LTO Programme consists continuation of qualified
for adequate programmes, development of new or
amendment some of existing programmes. All these
measures should be integrated into an overall plant life
management programme, which covers also the non-
safety classified SSCs and ensures all resources and
conditions for operation and functioning of the operating
company. 
Paks NPP considers LTO Programme as an overall
strategic programme which determines all areas of
activity of operational company, e.g. human resource
management, knowledge management. It demonstrates
the plant commitment. After three years of operation in
accordance with the LTO programme, experience should
be evaluated, assessed and the findings have to be
summarised in the Application for licence renewal. Besides
of the results of the review of AMPs and validation of
TLAAs these finding will demonstrate the safety and
reasonability of long-term operation.
5.2 Synergy Between Plant Processes
LTO Programme establishes strong link between all
activities of operating company. Proper management of
the implementation will use the synergy between these
activities. 
Paks NPP performed a comprehensive safety
upgrading programme, which required essential hardware
modifications. Thanks to this the core damage frequency
has been decreased up-to the level of ~10-5/a. Safety upgrading
was an unavoidable precondition of the decision for LTO.
Safety and plant commitment are the most important
aspect of public acceptance. 
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Safety upgrading caused direct or implicit technical
benefit. The safety upgrading modifications impacted the
most important safety systems. Due to these modifications
the safety systems or their essential parts had been
practically renewed, reconstructed. Consequently large
part of safety systems is not aged. In some cases safety
upgrading measures have direct influence on the lifetime
limiting processes. For example, the new relief valves
installed on the pressurizer provide the possibility of the
reactor over-pressurisation protection in cold state, i.e. it
eliminates the danger of brittle fracture of the reactor
vessel. 
The power will be up-rated by utilisation of modernised
fuel. Practically the enthalpy of the coolant at the reactor
outlet is increased only. Implementation of certain,
relatively simple modifications also needed, e.g.
modernisation of the primary pressure control system
and of core monitoring system, replacement of the
impellers of Main Circulating Pumps (MCP) on some
units. The potential interrelation of the power up-rate on
LTO programme is threefold: Power up-rate may cause
in some cases/transients higher parameters. However it
should not have an adverse effect on the lifetime expectations
of critical components. Therefore the conditions of
operation at up-rated power level have been taken into
account while reviewing the TLAAs. Due to modifications
the operation will be smoother, or some ageing problems
will be solved (cracking of the impellers of MCP). Power
up-rate has a positive impact on the economic viability of
long-term operation. 
Some modifications implemented during last ten
years had been targeted to improvement of the operation
reliability and cost effectiveness of power generation.
Examples for that are: replacement of main turbine
condensers, reconstruction of high pressure pre-heaters,
etc. The replacement the main turbine condenser, which
was motivated also by economic considerations, has an
essential impact on the lifetime of the steam-generators.
Steam generators are practically not replaceable in case
of WWER-440/213 type units therefore the steam
generator ageing is limiting the plant lifetime. The
dominant ageing mechanism is the steam generator heat-
exchange tube stress corrosion. The new condensers with
stainless steel tubing are leak-tight; they allowed the
introduction of the high pH water regime in the secondary
circuit providing better operational condition for
components of the feed water system and for the steam
generators as well. A 100% inspection of all steam
generators shows that the new condensers and the high
pH in the secondary circuit will improve the operating
conditions of steam generator tubes, less corrosion and
erosion products will be deposited on their surface. In
addition higher leak-tightness of the condenser decreases
intrusion of impurities from condenser cooling water.
According to recent assessment the steam generators
might be operated the target time of 50 years. 
6. CONCLUSIONS
In Hungary a comprehensive regulatory framework
and comprehensive plant system have been developed
for ensuring the safety of long-term operation of
WWER-440/213 type plant at Paks.
This followed the principles outlined in the paper.
Applying these principles a gapless system could be
established which ensures that any SSCs will be covered
by some of the plant programmes, and within the frame
of LTO Programme all conditions of proper operation
will be ensured in line with basic criterion of completeness
of plant practice.
Best international practice and state-of-the-art
methodologies have been applied while performing the
particular tasks for preparation and justification of long-
term operation and licence renewal. However, as it has
been demonstrated, any good examples and experiences
should be adapted in creative way taking into account the
design features, national regulations, and existing plant
practice. 
This way the strategy of Paks NPP to operate safely
as long as possible and economically reasonable at
higher power level will be ensured. 
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